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Abstract
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For economic reasons, consumer appliances and communication channels do not have high cybersecurity. So, due to the consumer section’s vulnerability and the communication channel, the
consumer section is a potential candidate for some cyber attackers. In this paper, the destructive impact
of the false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on the demand response real-time pricing is investigated.
Attacker manipulating the real-time price (RTP) signal in the smart meter causes the change in the
consumer’s load profile that affects network operation. This condition helps the attacker maximize
the power losses in the distribution networks subject to the available attacker budget and security
levels (SLs) of smart meters. A defense strategy based on the distribution network reconfiguration
is proposed against FDIAs to mitigate the harmful effects of launched cyber attacks. Also, a bi-level
optimization is used to model FDIA and defense strategy. At the upper level, smart meters’ optimal
location is modeled to launch the FDIA constrained by the attacker’s total budget. Also, at the lower
level, the network reconfiguration is modeled to find the switch’s optimal state to defend against
attack. Simulation carried out on the modified IEEE 94-bus system to evaluate the proposed defense
strategy efficiency.
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