مشخصات پژوهش

In a computer network, security is the most basic need of users and data that must be guaranteed. There are serious problems in providing this security. For example, due to the increasing security threats and the limited resources available to counter them, it is essential to use security resources optimally to defend against attacks [1-4]. Also, due to the scarcity of resources, the use of deceptive resources is used by both attackers and defenders. In other words, the attacker and the defender can perform deceptive actions that not only do not consume resources but also cause their opponent to be deceived and waste a lot of resources without gaining any significant achievement [2-4]. In the meantime, using game theory, effective approaches can be presented to understand the motivations, strategies, and consequently the allocation of limited resources of the attacker and the defender. In other words, suitable scenarios can be presented for these goals and make the attacker and the defender act optimally and win. In security games based on Stackelberg modeling, two important parameters must be considered: (1) the number of levels in which the game is modeled and (2) the principles and policies of deception. These two parameters will have a direct effect on the rules and formulas of the game and will also change the principle of Nash equilibrium. These two parameters can also change the conditions of costs, profits and losses and change the course of the game. The Stackelberg game is a sequential game in which certain decisions are taken and implemented sequentially and can model sequential multi-agent decision-making processes. In this game, players or competitors are divided into two groups: leader and follower. Leaders make the first move to maximize their profit. After the leader's move, the follower will also make the necessary decision and action. In other words, the Stackelberg model is a leadership-based game model that allows the dominant firm to set its pri